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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SHADUR, District Judge: 
 
This appeal stems from a fire that occurred on February 
4, 1992 at a corporate office building owned by one of the 
appellants in this action, Holmes Corporate Center 
("Holmes"). Krueger Associates, Inc., individually and 
trading as National Fulfillment Services ("National 
Fulfillment"), a commercial tenant at the corporate center 
whose offices were damaged by the fir e, is the other 
appellant.1 American District T elegraph Company of 
Pennsylvania and ADT Security Systems, Incorporated 
(collectively referred to as "ADT ," treated hereafter as a 
singular noun for convenience), which providedfire and 
burglar alarm services at the corporate center pursuant to 
a series of written agreements with Holmes, ar e appellees. 
 
National Fulfillment initiated the action on February 26, 
1993 via a multi-count complaint against ADT , seeking to 
recover its uninsured losses from thefire. Federal 
jurisdiction was invoked under 28 U.S.C. S1332 based on 
the parties' diverse citizenship. At their cor e, National 
Fulfillment's claims rested on the allegation that ADT's 
alarm system failed to alert fire fighters of the blaze in a 
timely manner. That alleged failure supposedly allowed the 
fire to burn out of control, causing National Fulfillment to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Eugene Krueger was one of two general partners in Holmes and was 
the sole shareholder of Krueger Associates at the time of the fire. We 
refer to appellants as "Holmes" and "National Fulfillment" to avoid any 
confusion that might result from the use of the Krueger name to 
designate either appellant. 
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suffer commercial and property losses for which it was 
underinsured. 
 
Several factors posed potential problems for National 
Fulfillment's action against ADT. For one, National 
Fulfillment itself had not contracted with ADT for the 
provision of alarm services. Instead, ADT provided alarm 
services to the office complex pursuant to a written series 
of agreements with Holmes. Additionally, when ADT 
contracted with Holmes to provide alarm service to Holmes 
(in the "Holmes-ADT Contract"), it substantially limited the 
scope of its undertaking by a contractual pr ovision 
disclaiming all warranties and expressly limiting liability. 
Although National Fulfillment claims to have been unaware 
of that provision in the Holmes-ADT Contract, it will be 
recalled that Eugene Krueger held an ownership interest in 
both Holmes and National Fulfillment (see n.2). 
 
After National Fulfillment sued ADT, the latter brought 
Holmes into the litigation by filing a thir d-party complaint 
against it. In that third-party complaint ADT sought 
defense and indemnification from Holmes against National 
Fulfillment's suit pursuant to this provision in Holmes-ADT 
Contract PE: 
 
       IN THE EVENT ANY PERSON, NOT A PARTY TO THIS 
       AGREEMENT, SHALL MAKE ANY CLAIM OR FILE ANY 
       LAWSUIT AGAINST ADT FOR FAILURE OF ITS 
       EQUIPMENT OR SERVICE IN ANY RESPECT, 
       [HOLMES] AGREES TO INDEMNIFY, DEFEND AND 
       HOLD ADT HARMLESS FROM ANY AND ALL SUCH 
       CLAIMS AND LAWSUITS INCLUDING THE PA YMENT 
       OF ALL DAMAGES, COSTS AND ATTORNEYS FEES. 
 
Holmes' answer to the third-party complaint asserted a 
cross-claim against National Fulfillment, claiming that 
National Fulfillment had a contractual obligation to provide 
a defense of, and indemnification for, ADT's claims against 
Holmes. 
 
ADT then moved for summary judgment both against 
National Fulfillment on the latter's claims against ADT and 
against Holmes on ADT's claim for defense and 
indemnification. On December 20, 1994 the district court 
granted summary judgment in favor of ADT with r espect to 
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its claim for defense and indemnity from Holmes, but it 
denied the motion as to National Fulfillment's claims, 
apparently to allow National Fulfillment to conduct 
discovery. In the same order the district court ruled that 
the conflict of interest created by Eugene Krueger's dual 
role as sole shareholder of National Fulfillment and as one 
of two general partners of Holmes precluded Holmes' 
control of ADT's defense. After discovery closed almost two 
years later, in October 1996 the district court granted 
ADT's renewed motion for summary judgment on all of 
National Fulfillment's claims. 
 
Holmes and National Fulfillment appealed those 
decisions, but on June 25, 1997 a panel of this Court 
dismissed those appeals for lack of jurisdiction because 
some issues in the litigation still remained unresolved: 
quantification of the amount of attorneys' fees recoverable 
by ADT pursuant to the Holmes-ADT Contract and a ruling 
on Holmes' crossclaim for indemnification fr om National 
Fulfillment based on their lease. Those issues wer e later 
ruled on by the district court. It held that ADT was entitled 
to an award of $313,185.83 in attorneys' fees, reducing 
ADT's original request of $403,440.83 by $90,255. It also 
found that Holmes was not entitled to indemnification from 
National Fulfillment based on the lease. 
 
National Fulfillment appeals the grant of summary 
judgment against it and the district court's denial of 
National Fulfillment's motions for sanctions against ADT for 
alleged discovery violations. Holmes appeals (1) the district 
court's order that ADT was entitled to defense and 
indemnification under the Holmes-ADT Contract, (2) the 
district court's rejection of Holmes' cr oss-claim against 
National Fulfillment and (3) the court's fee deter mination. 
We will begin with the issues raised by National Fulfillment, 
then turn to those raised by Holmes. W e affirm the orders 
of the district court in all respects. 
 
National Fulfillment's Appeal 
 
We first examine National Fulfillment's contention that 
the district court improperly granted summary judgment on 
its claims against ADT. National Fulfillment appeals the 
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dismissal of its five claims sounding in (1) strict liability, 
(2) negligence, (3) breach of implied warranty, (4) fraud and 
(5) negligent misrepresentation. 
 
Initially we note, despite National Fulfillment's 
protestations to the contrary, that nothing pr ohibited the 
district court from ruling on ADT's renewed motion for 
summary judgment. Under the law of the case doctrine the 
district court's denial of ADT's initial summary judgment 
motion did not create any bar to the court's later 
reconsideration of the renewed motion (see, e.g., Deisler v. 
McCormack Aggregates Co., 54 F .3d 1074, 1086 n. 20 (3d 
Cir. 1995), quoting Schultz v. Onan Corp ., 737 F.2d 339, 
345 (3d Cir. 1984)). After having tur ned down ADT's first 
try without opinion in an apparent effort to allow National 
Fulfillment to conduct discovery, the district court surely 
acted within its discretion in reconsidering the motion post- 
discovery.2 
 
We turn then to National Fulfillment's substantive claims 
against ADT, with Pennsylvania law pr oviding the rules of 
decision. None survives analysis. 
 
First, we agree with the district court that National 
Fulfillment has no cause of action in strict liability against 
ADT (see Lobianco v. Property Prot., Inc., 437 A.2d 417 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1981)). Three members of the seven-judge court 
in Lobianco rejected the application of Restatement (Second) 
of Torts ("Restatement") S402A because (just as in this case) 
the provider of an alarm system (in that instance a burglar 
alarm) was not being sued by an "otherwise defenseless 
victim" (id. at 424): There the homeowner (just like National 
Fulfillment here) knew everything about the value of the 
property at risk (as the alarm system pr ovider did not), 
could get insurance against the loss and should not be 
permitted to shift the risk of loss to the alarm system 
provider "as a cost of doing business" (id. at 424-25). Two 
other members of the court joined in holding Restatement 
S402A inapplicable, for the reason that (just as in this case) 
the harm to the owner's property was the foreseeable 
consequence of the alarm system's malfunctioning, not the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Indeed, any claimed error the district court might arguably have made 
in reconsidering the motion would have been har mless in any event. 
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result of a product that was itself defectively manufactured 
and hence unsafe (id. at 426-27). In sum, National 
Fulfillment's attempted invocation of the Restatement's 
strict liability provision runs counter to Pennsylvania law. 
 
Nor is there any merit to its negligence claim. ADT owed 
no legal duty in tort to National Fulfillment when it 
contracted to provide Holmes with fir e alarm services (see 
Gerace v. Holmes Prot. of Phila., 516 A.2d 354, 358 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1986)). And there is no basis for finding such a 
duty under subsection (c) of Restatement S324A to enable 
National Fulfillment to proceed in negligence against ADT, 
for just as in Gerace (see id.) ther e is no evidence of 
National Fulfillment's harm having come fr om its reliance 
on ADT's undertaking to Holmes.3 To the contrary, National 
Fulfillment's nebulous contention that it suf fered harm 
because it decided to forgo other protective services in 
reliance on the ADT system is not only unsupported by the 
record but is actually contradicted by the evidence that it, 
at the recommendation of its insurance company, installed 
Halon extinguishers before the fire. 
 
Moreover, any actual reliance by National Fulfillment 
(and none has been shown) would not have been 
reasonable. ADT's system was a detection system, not a fire 
suppression system. Nothing prevented National Fulfillment 
from installing fire suppression devices (as, for example, a 
sprinkler system). National Fulfillment cannot use Holmes' 
purchase of alarm services from ADT to excuse its own 
failure to take steps adequately calculated to protect itself 
from fire-related losses. 
 
National Fulfillment's third claim--br each of implied 
warranty--similarly falls flat. Under Pennsylvania law 
implied warranty claims by parties not in privity with the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Though National Fulfillment's counsel made a more general reference 
to Restatement S324A during oral argument, its briefs on appeal focused 
entirely on its claim of reliance (the subject covered by subsection (c)). 
It 
is scarcely in a position to expand its contentions belatedly in that 
fashion, but in any event subsection (b) is plainly inapplicable by its 
terms, and any subsection (a) claim would be scotched by the holding in 
Turbe v. Government of the Virgin Islands, 938 F.2d 427, 432 (3d Cir. 
1991). 
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defendant may be maintained only in cases gover ned by the 
UCC's warranty provisions or by RestatementS402A (see 
Manor Junior Coll. v. Kaller's Inc., 507 A.2d 1245, 1249 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1986)). That alone would suffice to affirm the 
dismissal of the claim: We have already found Restatement 
S402A inapplicable, and it is at best questionable that the 
UCC applies in the present context.4  But even if we were to 
adopt the doubtful premise that UCC's Art. 2 could 
potentially come into play, it is plain that ADT successfully 
disclaimed all implied warranties in Holmes-ADT Contract 
PE, and that the disclaimer was effective against National 
Fulfillment (see 13 Pa. C.S. S2316, S2318 cmt. 1). 
 
Finally, National Fulfillment's fourth and fifth claims-- 
fraud and negligent misrepresentation--fail as well. Without 
specific citation to the record, National Fulfillment asserts 
in conclusory fashion that ADT made misrepr esentations 
that could be the basis for such claims. But National 
Fulfillment's only predicate for that contention rests on 
ADT's alleged discovery violations that occurr ed after the 
fire. It goes without saying that an asserted 
misrepresentation that post-dated thefire could not have 
caused any of National Fulfillment's fir e-related injuries. 
 
And any notion that ADT's alleged discovery violations 
prevented National Fulfillment from discovering any 
possible misrepresentations ADT might have made before 
the fire is, as the district court noted, absurd. By definition 
any representation on which a party has purportedly relied 
has to be known to that party--else how could reliance take 
place? National Fulfillment's total failur e to have identified 
any such misrepresentations by ADT is fatal to any claim of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Although National Fulfillment contends that Cucchi v. Rollins Prot. 
Servs. Co., 574 A.2d 565 (Pa. 1990) holds that the UCC applies to 
transactions involving the lease of goods (specifically, a burglar alarm 
system), that seriously overstates Cucchi's holding. Cucchi involved a 
plurality opinion in which only two of the seven justices found that UCC 
Art. 2 applied to the lease of the burglar alarm system, while the 
majority of the justices disavowed that proposition. Since then the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has emphasized that Cucci's precedential 
authority "is limited to the facts of that case" (Keblish v. Thomas Equip. 
Ltd., 660 A.2d 38, 40 n.1 (Pa. 1995))--the type of damnation by faint 
praise that signals an exceedingly weak reed on which to lean. 
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reliance, which is an essential component of any claim of 
fraud or negligent misrepresentation. 
 
That leaves just two tag ends to be cleaned up in this 
part of the appeal. First, the absence of any viable 
substantive claim of course deprives National Fulfillment's 
request for punitive damages of any underpinning. We also 
affirm the denial of that claim. Second, we likewise affirm 
the district court's rejection of National Fulfillment's 
requests for sanctions based on ADT's alleged spoliation of 
evidence. Simply put, National Fulfillment has pr ovided no 
basis to conclude that the district court committed an 




As for appellant Holmes, it first challenges on two 
grounds the district court's determination that it was 
required to defend ADT pursuant to a clause in the 
Holmes-ADT Contract:6 
 
        1. Holmes contends that the contractual pr ovision on 
       which the defense and indemnity provision was based 
       was inconspicuous and therefore unenfor ceable. 
 
        2. Even if the provision were found to be enforceable, 
       Holmes argues that it assertedly did not r equire 
       Holmes to pay ADT's legal costs associated with 
       defending against National Fulfillment's suit. 
 
Both of those contentions also fail. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. We are relatedly constrained to observe that the presentation of the 
"facts" relating to this appeal in National Fulfillment's briefs before us 
was improperly one-sided, not at all in confor mity with the 
responsibility 
of an appellant to tender an objective portrayal. And National Fulfillment 
spent an inordinate amount of time arguing that ADT's alleged 
commission of discovery violations should serve as a predicate for 
liability. Those unsuccessful efforts seem little more than an attempted 
papering over of the weakness of its original claims. 
 
6. Both sides agree that because ther e is no judgment against ADT, any 
issues involving the validity of the indemnity pr ovision are moot. All 
that 
remains in this portion of the appeal is the question whether the 
Holmes-ADT Contract required Holmes to pay ADT's defense costs. 
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As to Holmes' first argument, Pennsylvania law does 
countenance certain claims of unconscionability when 
"based on inconspicuous or unclear contractual language, 
in particular, if the parties have unequal bargaining power" 
(Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 182 (3d Cir. 
1999)). But simply to state that proposition confirms its 
inapplicability here. As the district court noted, the 
controlling provision was contained in a boldface paragraph 
written in its entirety in capital letters--typography that 
distinguished it from other provisions on the reverse side of 
the contract. And the contract's text, also in a boldface 
legend set forth immediately above the signatur e line, 
specifically directed the signer's attention to the terms and 
conditions on that reverse side. Nor is ther e any room for 
disputing the clarity of the provision. Finally, nothing in the 
evidence suggests any material (or indeed any) dif ference in 
bargaining power between ADT and Holmes. In sum, there 
is no basis for holding the provision unconscionable. 
 
Holmes also says that it was not requir ed to pay ADT's 
defense costs according to the terms of the Holmes-ADT 
Contract. According to Holmes, the absence of any 
judgment against ADT precludes an award of attorneys' 
fees under the contract. Not so, for Holmes-ADT Contract 
PE required Holmes both to indemnify and to defend ADT. 
So when National Fulfillment filed suit against ADT, that 
event alone triggered Holmes' obligation to defend ADT. 
Holmes' assertion that the contractual defense pr ovision 
somehow extends only to meritorious claims has no basis 
whatever. To the contrary, the pr ovision specifies that 
Holmes' obligation extends to "any claim or lawsuit." We 
therefore hold that Holmes is expr essly obligated by the 
Holmes-ADT Contract to pay ADT's defense costs. 7 
 
Next, Holmes appeals the district court's deter mination 
that National Fulfillment was not requir ed to indemnify 
Holmes for Holmes' expenses incurred in paying ADT's 
attorneys' fees pursuant to the Holmes-ADT Contract. 
Holmes contends that it is entitled to indemnification 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Holmes also contends that it should be per mitted to participate in or 
control ADT's defense. Because our disposition ends this case, any such 
prospective request for participation or control is rendered moot. 
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pursuant to this provision in its lease to National 
Fulfillment: 
 
       Lessee [National Fulfillment] shall defend, indemnify, 
       and hold harmless Lessor [Holmes] fr om and against 
       any and all claims, demands, suits, damages, liability, 
       and costs (including counsel fees and expenses) arising 
       out of or in any manner connected with any act or 
       omission, negligent or otherwise of Lessee, thir d 
       persons, or any of their agents, servants or employees 
       which arise out of or are in any way connected with the 
       erection, maintenance, use, operation, existence or 
       occupation of the Demised Premises, hallways, 
       entranceways, stairs or any other common areas 
       (exterior or interior), and the streets, driveways, alleys, 
       lawns, sidewalks and curbs adjacent thereto including 
       those resulting from any work in connection with the 
       alterations, changes, new construction or demolition. 
 
We agree with the district court that the quoted provision 
plays no role here. ADT's suit against Holmes, for which 
Holmes seeks indemnity, was predicated upon Holmes' 
breach of its contract with ADT. As such it does not "arise 
out of," nor is it "in any way connected with," the "erection, 
maintenance, use, operation, existence or occupation of the 
Demised Premises" in the normal sense of that lease 
language. Hence that claim by Holmes is also lacking in 
merit. 
 
That leaves Holmes' final challenge: its assertion that the 
$313,185.83 awarded to ADT in attorneys' fees was 
excessive. Although Holmes has ignored the applicable 
standard of review, a district court's award of attorneys' 
fees is reversible only for abuse of discr etion (Washington v. 
Philadelphia County. Ct. Com. Pl., 89 F.3d 1031, 1034 (3d 
Cir. 1996)). 
 
In its 14-page order the district court explained its 
reduction of ADT's requested fees by $90,255, reflecting (1) 
time spent in reviewing the indemnification claim against 
Holmes, (2) time that the court considered excessive or 
redundant and (3) expenses considered to be non- 
reimbursable overhead. Despite that car efully articulated 
set of downward adjustments, Holmes char ges that the 
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district court abused its discretion by not r educing the 
award by a greater percentage. But that ipse dixit is 
unaccompanied by any reasoned basis for labeling the 
district court's determination an abuse of discretion. We 




We AFFIRM the district court's grant of summary 
judgment on National Fulfillment's claims against ADT, its 
denial of sanctions for ADT's alleged discovery violations, its 
decision that National Fulfillment is not r equired to 
indemnify Holmes and its determination that Holmes is 
required to pay ADT $313,185.83 pursuant to the Holmes- 
ADT Contract. 
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